Endogenously Segmented Asset Market in an Inventory Theoretic Model of Money Demand by Jonathan Chiu
Working Paper/Document de travail
2007-46
Endogenously Segmented Asset Market
in an Inventory Theoretic Model
of Money Demand
by Jonathan Chiu
www.bankofcanada.caBank of Canada Working Paper 2007-46
August 2007
Endogenously Segmented Asset Market




Monetary and Financial Analysis Department
Bank of Canada
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1A 0G9
jchiu@bankofcanada.ca
Bank of Canada working papers are theoretical or empirical works-in-progress on subjects in
economics and ﬁnance. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author.
No responsibility for them should be attributed to the Bank of Canada.
ISSN 1701-9397 © 2007 Bank of Canadaii
Acknowledgements
This is a chapter of my dissertation. I would like to thank my advisors Igor Livshits and
Miguel Molico for their invaluable guidance. I am also grateful to Ian Christensen,
Chris Edmond, Andrés Erosa, Huberto Ennis, Joel Fried, David Laidler, Jim MacGee,
Iourii Manovskii, Cesaire Meh, Maxim Poletaev, Malik Shukayev, Alex Wolman, Randall Wright
as well as seminar participants in the CEA 2004 Annual Meeting, SED 2005 Meeting, the Bank of
Canada, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Federal
Reserve Bank of Richmond, the University of Concordia, McMaster, Pennsylvania, Simon Fraser
and Western Ontario for helpful comments and suggestions.iii
Abstract
This paper studies the effects of monetary policy in an inventory theoretic model of money
demand. In this model, agents keep inventories of money, despite the fact that money is
dominated in rate of return by interest bearing assets, because they must pay a ﬁxed cost to
transfer funds between the asset market and the goods market. Unlike the exogenous
segmentation models in the literature, the timings of money transfers are endogenous. By
allowing agents to choose the timings of money transfers, the model endogenizes the degree of
market segmentation as well as the magnitude of liquidity effects, price sluggishness and
variability of velocity. First, I show that the endogenous segmentation model can generate the
positive long run relationship between money growth and velocity in the data which the
exogenous segmentation model fails to capture. Second, I show that the short run effects of money
shocks in an exogenous segmentation model (such as the linear inﬂation response to money
shock, the liquidity effect and the sluggish price adjustment) are not robust. In an endogenous
segmentation model, the equilibrium response to money shocks is non-linear and non-monotonic.
Moreover, for large money shocks, there is no liquidity effect and no sluggish price adjustment.
JEL classiﬁcation: E31, E41, E50
Bank classiﬁcation: Transmission of monetary policy; Monetary policy framework
Résumé
L’auteur examine les effets de la politique monétaire à l’aide d’un modèle de demande de
monnaie inspiré de la théorie de la gestion des stocks. Même si les actifs rémunérés offrent un
meilleur taux de rendement que la monnaie, les agents conservent des stocks de monnaie, car les
transferts de fonds entre marché ﬁnancier et marché des biens sont soumis à un coût ﬁxe. Prenant
le contrepied des modèles avec segmentation exogène présentés dans la littérature, l’auteur
permet aux agents de décider eux-mêmes du moment des transferts. Il fait ainsi du degré de
segmentation des marchés une donnée endogène de son modèle, au même titre que l’ampleur des
effets de liquidité, la lenteur de l’ajustement des prix et la variabilité de la vitesse de circulation de
la monnaie. L’auteur montre d’abord que, contrairement au modèle avec segmentation exogène,
son modèle avec segmentation endogène parvient à reproduire la relation positive qui lie à long
terme la croissance et la vitesse de circulation de la monnaie d’après les données. Il montre
ensuite que les répercussions (réaction linéaire de l’inﬂation, effet de liquidité, rigidité dans
l’ajustement des prix) entraînées à court terme par les chocs monétaires dans les modèles avec
segmentation exogène ne sont pas robustes. Dans le modèle avec segmentation endogène, lesiv
valeurs d’équilibre réagissent aux chocs monétaires de façon non linéaire et non monotone. De
plus, lorsque ces chocs sont importants, on n’observe aucun effet de liquidité et les prix s’ajustent
rapidement.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E31, E41, E50
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Transmission de la politique monétaire; Cadre de la politique
monétaire1. Introduction
An important characteristic for a good monetary model to have is the ability to reproduce
the real world's response to monetary policy. Many economists agree, for instance, that
empirical evidence supports the presence of liquidity e®ects, sluggish price adjustment and
the variability of the velocity of money1. The liquidity e®ect is viewed as an important
channel through which the monetary policy has impact on the economy. And the magnitude
of the policy impact on nominal output, as suggested by the equation of exchange, depends
on the velocity of money. If the price level cannot adjust fully, then the short run real output
has to be a®ected. Therefore, responses of the interest rate, price level and velocity play
critical roles in determining the short run real e®ects of monetary policy. Standard monetary
models, however, have di±culties generating these features. For example, in a standard
cash-in-advance (CIA) model, a temporary money shock results in an immediate and full
adjustment of price level, without any e®ect on the interest rate or the velocity of money 2.
The key reason is that agents in a CIA model are allowed to transfer money from an asset
market to the goods market costlessly every period3.
Some economists have argued that introducing frictions into the asset market can improve
the performance of the standard model (See Baumol (1952), Tobin (1956), Lucas (1990) and
Alvarez, Atkeson and Kehoe (1999)). In this paper, I build on this literature to endogenize
agents' decision on money transfers between the goods market and the asset market by
assuming that agents must pay a ¯xed transaction cost to transfer money. In my model, the
optimal timing of money transfers is determined by the trade-o® between the transaction
cost and the interest forgone by holding money. Because of the ¯xed cost, agents may choose
to keep inventories of money instead of making transfers every period. As a result, the asset
market is segmented in the sense that when the government injects money, only a fraction of
1Liquidity e®ects refer to the drop in short-term interest rates in response to money injections. See
Cochrane (1989), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1995, 1997), Strongin (1992), Gordon and Leeper
(1994) and Hamilton (1997) for empirical support. Price sluggishness refers to the slow response of the price
level to money shocks. See, for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997, 2001). Variability of
velocity refers to the long-run and short-run °uctuations of the income velocity of money. See Hodrick,
Kocherlakota and Lucas (1991) and Wang and Shi (2001).
2While a limited participation model can produce liquidity e®ects, it cannot match the degree of the
price sluggishness and the variability of velocity. Also, a standard sticky price model is able to generate
price sluggishness but it has di±culty matching the magnitudes of the other two features. See, for example,
Christiano (1991), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997), Edge (2000), Keen (2001) and Dotsey and
King (2001).
3When money is injected into the asset market, all agents are on the demand side of the transaction. They
just increase their cash holdings in equal proportion to the money shock, without a®ecting the equilibrium
interest rate. Because agents spend all of their cash holdings in the goods market immediately, there is a
proportional jump in the current price level and the velocity of money is identically equal to 1.
1agents, currently in contact with the asset market, are on the other side of the transaction.
Therefore, the interest rate must decline to induce these agents to absorb a disproportionate
share of the new money, leading to the liquidity e®ect. Because the new money is then kept
as an inventory by this fraction of agents and is spent gradually over several periods' time, the
price level rises gradually through time, even though prices are completely °exible, resulting
in the sluggish price response. Also, the money injection can change the distribution of money
shares across agents, leading to the variability of the velocity. Moreover, by endogenizing the
degree of market segmentation, the model also endogenizes the degree of price sluggishness,
the °uctuation of velocity and the magnitude of liquidity e®ects. I refer this model as an
inventory model of money demand with endogenous segmentation.
Alvarez, Atkeson and Edmond (2003) study a simpli¯ed version of the framework dis-
cussed above, which I refer as an inventory model with exogenous segmentation. Their
exogenous segmentation model can also generate the liquidity e®ect, the price sluggishness
and the variability of velocity. But, instead of endogenizing the timing of money transfers,
their model exogenously imposes a restriction that agents must make transfers once every
N > 1 periods, where N is taken as a parameter. Under this restriction, agents are not
allowed to adjust the timing of transfers in response to policy interventions, even in extreme
changes of circumstance. As suggested by Lucas's critique, the validity of their model im-
plications is questionable because private agents' choice of money transfer timing is taken as
a structural parameter invariant under interventions. In particular, one would expect that,
if agents are allowed to adjust their transfer timings, a money injection may induce more
agents to make money transfers in the current period, and thus dampen the liquidity e®ect.
Moreover, a su±ciently large in°ation may cause agents to increase their transfer frequencies,
and thus speeding up the price adjustment process.
The main objective of this paper is to derive long run and short run e®ects of monetary
policy in an endogenous segmentation model and contrast its implications with that in an
exogenous segmentation model. For a small money shock, agents do not adjust their transfer
frequencies and thus the two models produce the same implications. For a large money shock,
however, it is optimal for agents to adjust their transfer frequencies and thus the implications
of two models di®er.
My key ¯ndings are as follows. I show that the endogenous-segmentation model can
generate the positive long run relationship between money growth and velocity in the data
which the exogenous segmentation model fails to capture. In an exogenous segmentation
model, the long run velocity of money is decreasing in money growth. In an endogenous
2segmentation model, there are discrete jumps in the long run velocity as money growth rate
rises. I also study the short run e®ects of money shocks. First, in an exogenous segmentation
model, responses to money shocks are linear, monotonic and symmetric. By contrast, in an
endogenous segmentation model, responses are non-linear, non-monotonic and asymmetric.
Second, an exogenous segmentation model is a good approximation of the endogenous seg-
mentation model only for small money shocks. For large money shocks, implications of the
exogenous segmentation model are not robust.
This paper is related to the existing literature of inventory theoretic models of money
demand. These models are ¯rst studied by Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) who consider
the optimal cash management of an individual agent. Jovanovic (1982), Romer (1986) and
Chatterjee and Corbae (1992) develop general equilibrium versions of these models and use
them to study how di®erent constant in°ation rates a®ect the steady state. All of those
models, however, cannot examine the dynamic response to money shocks and thus cannot
study such issues as the sluggishness of the price adjustment and the presence of the liquidity
e®ect. While Grossman and Weiss (1983), Rotemberg (1984) and Alvarez, Atkeson and
Edmond (2003) study the e®ect of monetary policy in the transition, they consider exogenous
segmentation models and thus agents are not allowed to adjust their transfer frequencies in
response to policy shocks.4 In the model by Alvarez, Atkeson and Kehoe (1999), agents
also have to pay a ¯xed cost to trade asset. However, they assume that the CIA constraint
is always binding and thus agents do not keep inventories of money. A closely related and
perhaps complementary work to this paper is Kahn and Thomas (2006) who study a similar
inventory problem in a di®erent model setup.5 They do not look at the long run e®ects of
money growth, or the non-linear and asymmetric short run responses to money shocks which
are the main contributions of this paper.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I outline the model setup.
In Section 3, I present properties of the stationary equilibrium in the exogenous segmentation
and endogenous segmentation models. Section 4 discusses the long-run relationship between
the velocity of money and the money growth. Section 5 derives short-run responses of the
economy to money policy shocks. Section 6 concludes this paper.
4Grossman(1987) studies a Baumol-Tobin model with proportional transaction costs in which the money
transfer timing is partly endogenous.
5Kahn and Thomas assume complete market and idiosyncratic ¯xed costs to gain tractability. Here, I
assume a constant ¯xed cost and allow only nominal bonds to highlight the distribution e®ect of money
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Figure 1: Time line
2. Model
Consider a cash-in-advance economy with an asset market and a goods market. Time is
discrete and denoted t = 0;1;2;:::. There is a measure one of households. Each household
comprises of a seller and a buyer. We assume that each household i 2 [0;1] has access to two
¯nancial accounts: the brokerage account manages its portfolio of assets and the checking
account manages its money balance held for transactions in the goods market. There is a
government that injects money into the asset market via open market operations. The supply
of money stock in period t is Mt and the (gross) growth rate is ¹t = Mt=Mt¡1.
Households that participate in the open market operation purchase money with assets
held in their brokerage accounts. These households must transfer money to their checking
account before they can spend it on consumption. To make a transfer of money, a household
needs to pay a ¯xed utility cost ´t > 0 6. Each household receives one unit of endowment





t[logct(i) ¡ ´tJ(xt(i))]; 0 < ¯ < 1 (1)
In (1), ct(i) and xt(i) denote respectively the real amount of consumption and money transfer
of i in period t. J(x) is an indicator function such that J(x) = 1 when x 6= 0 and J(x) = 0
when x = 0. Households cannot consume their own endowment, and have to purchase
6Measuring the ¯xed cost in terms of utility allows for a direct comparison with the existing exogenous
segmentation models in which no goods are lost as a result of money transfers. Here, the ¯xed cost captures the
time cost, decision making and intermediation costs associated with money transfers and portfolio adjustment.
4consumption from other households in the goods market. The timing of the model is as
follows. Each period is divided into two sub-periods (Figure 1). In the ¯rst sub-period, each
household trades assets held in its brokerage account in the asset market. In the second
sub-period, the buyer in each household purchases consumption in the goods market using
money held in the checking account, while the seller exchanges the endowment in the goods
market for Pt amount of money which denotes the price level in the current period. In the
next period, the revenue is deposited into the household's brokerage account in the asset
market.
We turn now our attention to the technology of transferring balances between the broker-
age and the checking accounts. There are two special cases. First, when the transfer timing
is exogenous, each household can only make transfers once every N periods where N is a
parameter, irrespective of the state of the economy. If N = 1, it reduces to the standard
cash-in-advance model. Second, when the transfer timing is endogenous, all households can
make transfers in the current period after paying a ¯xed cost. One would choose to make a
transfer when the bene¯ts of doing so outweigh the associated ¯xed cost and thus the transfer
decision depends on the condition of the economy. These special cases may be represented
by the following two speci¯cations of the ¯xed cost. Suppose a household is allowed to make
a money transfer in period t after paying a ¯xed utility cost ´t. If the transfer timing is
exogenous with a transfer opportunity once every N periods, then the ¯xed cost paid by a
type j 2 f0;1;:::;N ¡ 1g household is given by
´j+s
(
= 0; for s = 0;N;2N;:::
= 1; otherwise
When the transfer timing is endogenous, I assume that ´t = ´ > 0 for all t.
The money holding of household i at the beginning of the second sub-period is denoted
Mt(i) which is equal to the quantity of money that it held over in its checking account last
period Zt¡1(i) as well as the transfer Ptxt(i) made this period. The household spends part
of Mt(i) on goods, Ptct(i), and carries the unspent balance in its checking account into next
period, Zt(i) ¸ 0. In sum:
5Mt(i) = Zt¡1(i) + Ptxt(i); (2)
Mt(i) ¸ Ptct(i) + Zt(i) (3)
In addition to the constraints on the household's checking account, the household also
faces a sequence of constraints on its brokerage account. I assume that, in the asset market,
the household can trade one-period bonds, each of which pays one dollar into the household's
brokerage account next period. Let Bt(i) denote the stock of bonds held by household i at
the end of period t. I assume that each household's real bond holdings must remain within
an arbitrarily large bound. A household's bond and money holdings in its brokerage account
must satisfy:
Bt¡1(i) + Pt¡1 ¡ Pt¿t = qtBt(i) + Ptxt(i); (4)
where qt is the price of bond in period t and Pt¿t are nominal lump-sum taxes. Each
household maximizes (1) subject to (2),(3) and (4).
Let Bt be the total stock of government bonds in period t. The government faces a
sequence of budget constraints
Bt¡1 = Mt ¡ Mt¡1 + Pt¿t + qtBt;
together with an arbitrarily large bound on the government's real bond issuance. The gov-
ernment implements monetary policy by open market operations in the asset market. In
particular, the government increases the supply of money stock by buying bonds with money,











6An equilibrium of this economy is a collection of prices fqt;Ptg1
t=0 , household decision
fct(i);xt(i);Bt(i);Mt(i);Zt(i)g1
t=0, and a government policy f¿t;¹t;Btg1
t=0 , such that (i) the
household decision solves its problem when prices are taken as given, (ii) the government
budget constraint, and (iii) the goods market, money market, and the bond market clearing
conditions are satis¯ed for all t.
3. Stationary Equilibrium
This section derives the properties of the stationary equilibrium. I ¯rst examine the bench-
mark case with exogenous transfer timing and then move to the case with endogenous transfer
timing. I assume that the gross money growth rate is constant at Mt=Mt¡1 = ¹ss and the
tax rate is constant at ¿. Let us scale the nominal variables by the aggregate money stock
and de¯ne bt = Bt=Mt, bt(i) = Bt(i)=Mt, zt(i) = Zt(i)=Mt, and pt = Pt=Mt.
3.1 Exogenous-Segmentation Model
In the exogenous segmentation model, each household is allowed to make a transfer once
every N periods. In each period, there are N types of households (s = 0;1;2;:::;N ¡1 where
s is the number of time periods since a household last withdrew from the brokerage account)
and each type is of measure 1
N. I aim to derive a stationary equilibrium with constant prices
(p;q). To derive the equilibrium, I need to choose an initial distribution of bond holdings
which will give rise to a constant bond price q =
¯
¹ss. 7 As shown in the Appendix, the ¯rst
order conditions of households imply that the consumption and money holdings of a type j














;j = 0;1;:::;N ¡ 1 (6)
Note that after a type 0 household replenishes its checking account, its money holding,
zs, is decreasing over time until it is exhausted in N periods' time. Due to discounting and
in°ation, the amount of consumption, cs, is decreasing over time (by a factor
¯
¹ss) until the
7I focus on equilibria in which no households hold money in the brokerage accounts, and households
exhaust their money holding before making transfers. See the Appendix for the details.
























In a standard cash-in-advance model, N = 1, and all of the money stock is circulated
every period, accordingly the price level is one. Finally, it can be shown that the bond
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In the endogenous segmentation model, all households can choose to make transfers in re-
sponse to the condition of the economy. Given (z¡1;b¡1;p¡1), a household chooses sequences








[(bt¡1 + pt¡1)=¹ss ¡ pt(¿ + xt)]
zt = zt¡1=¹ss + pt(xt ¡ ct)
J(x) =
(
0 if x = 0
1 if x 6= 0
8I ¯rst consider the decision of a household with z¡1 = 0 and show that, with constant
prices, it is optimal to choose equally spaced transfers. Let d¤ = (0;t¤
1;t¤
2;:::) denote the
optimal choice of transfer dates. It is shown in the Appendix that, if pt = p and qt = q =
¯
¹ss
for all t, then t¤
j+1 ¡ t¤
j = t¤
1 = n for j = 1;2;::: and for some positive integer n. 8
How should this household choose the optimal n? Increasing n makes the payment of the
transfer cost less frequent but also makes the consumption pro¯le less smooth. This tradeo®
is illustrated by the two functions G(n) and D(n) in Figure 2 (derived in the Appendix).
D(n) = ln(
¯
¹ss)(1 ¡ ¯n + nln¯) represents the marginal utility cost of increasing n due to
the unsmoothed consumption pro¯le. G(n) = ¡´(1 ¡ ¯)ln¯ represents the marginal utility
gain of increasing n due to less frequent payment of transfer cost.
Figure 2: Determination of optimal n




n  n+1 
Because G(n) > 0;D(0) = 0;D(1) = 1;D0(n) > 0 and D00(n) > 0, we can de¯ne
a unique b n that solves D(b n) = G(b n). Denote the value of choosing n by V (n). When
n < b n, V (n) is increasing in n because the marginal gain from the transfer cost reduction
can compensate for the marginal cost of having a unsmoothed consumption pro¯le. When
n > b n, V (n) is decreasing in n because the marginal cost of a unsmoothed consumption
pro¯le outweighs the marginal gain from saving the transfer cost. De¯ne n as the integer
part of b n so that n · b n < n + 1: The optimal choice of n, denoted as n¤, is given by





n if V (n) ¸ V (n + 1)
n + 1 if V (n + 1) ¸ V (n)
After solving the individual problem, we can now turn to derive properties of the sym-
metric stationary equilibrium (SSE). In what follows, we focus on equilibria in which the
initial endowments of bonds are such that the fraction of households making money transfers
is constant over time. Moreover, the initial bond holding is such that households that make
transfers at the same period start with identical initial wealth. It is shown in the Appendix
that, for each set of (´;¯;¹ss;¿), a SSE exists, and generically, this is the unique SSE.
Figure 3: A symmetric stationary Equilibrium
As an example, Figure 3 shows the cycles of money and bond holdings as well as the
optimal transfer as a function of the money and bond holdings, x(z¡1;b¡1), in a SSE with
(´;¯;¹ss;¿) = (0:5;0:9;1;0:1). In this equilibrium, a household chooses to withdraw once
every three periods. Graph (c) shows that, when z¡1 is low and/or b¡1 is high, the household
tends to withdraw from the brokerage account. When z¡1 is high and b¡1 is low, it tends to
deposit to the brokerage account. In all other cases, it chooses not to transfer.
A distinct feature of an endogenous segmentation model is that N = n responds to
changes in the state of the economy. How is the equilibrium value of N a®ected by the sizes
of the ¯xed cost and money growth? Note that an increase in ´ shifts G(n) upward and
leaves D(n) unchanged. An increase in ¹ss shifts D(n) upward and leaves G(n) unchanged.
10Therefore, the equilibrium value of N is increasing in ´ and decreasing in ¹ss
9. The intuition
is that the net gain from making a transfer is increasing in the in°ation rate and is decreasing
in the ¯xed cost. Figure 4 plots the equilibrium choice of N for di®erent combinations of
´ and ¹ss, when ¯ = 0:9. Note that, when ´ = 0, the model degenerates to the standard
cash-in-advance model in which households make transfer every period (N = 1).
Figure 4: Endogenous Choice of N(¯ = 0:9)
4. Velocity and Money Growth in the Long Run
This section discusses the long-run relationships between the velocity and the money growth
rate in the exogenous segmentation model and the endogenous segmentation model. I will
argue that the implication of the endogenous segmentation model is more consistent with
the data.
4.1 Exogenous-Segmentation Model
In the exogenous segmentation model, it can be shown that the aggregate velocity of the
economy in a stationary equilibrium is given by
9Jovanovic(1982) and Romer(1986) consider continuous time models in settings di®erent from this paper





























ss (¹ss ¡ 1)
Note that, when N = 1, the model reduces to the standard cash-in-advance model and
the velocity is constant at one. The following proposition concerns the e®ect of the money
growth when N > 1:
Proposition 1: In an exogenous-timing model, if N > 1 and ¹ss > 1, as ¯ ! 1, v is
decreasing in ¹ss.10
An easy way to get intuition for this proposition is to consider the simple case when N = 2.
With log utility and ¯ ! 1, a type s = 0 household (who just made a transfer) with money
holding Mt(0) spends Ptct(0) = 1
2Mt(0) on current consumption and keeps Mt+1(1) = 1
2Mt(0)
money holding for the next period. With an in°ation rate ¹ss, the current money holdings
of the two types are related by Mt(1) = 1
2¹ssMt(0). The money market clearing condition
Mt = 1
2Mt(0)+ 1







2¹ss+1. Moreover, denoting vt as the aggregate velocity and vt(i) as the individual






























Therefore, the velocity is decreasing in money growth rate: dv
d¹ss = ¡ 1
(2¹ss+1)2 < 0. The
10For ¯ < 1, simulation shows that v is still decreasing in ¹ss for reasonable sizes of ¯ and N. It holds for
example for ¯ > 0:3 and N < 20.
12Figure 5: Velocity and Money Growth in the Long Run
idea is that, the aggregate velocity is a weighted average of the individual velocities where the
weights are given by the distribution of money holdings. With a higher money growth rate,
a larger share of money is distributed to type s = 0 who has a smaller individual velocity,
thus lowering the aggregate velocity (Figure 5).
4.2 Endogenous-Segmentation Model
As discussed in section 3.2, with endogenous timing of money transfers, N is decreasing in
¹ss because households choose to make transfers more frequently in response to a higher
money growth. In the Appendix, it is shown that a reduction in N can raise the velocity of
money. Combining this result with proposition 1, we have the following ¯nding.
Proposition 2: In an endogenous segmentation model with ¯ ! 1 and N > 1, as ¹ss
increases, (1) v is decreasing when N is ¯xed, and (2) v jumps up when N is adjusted.
As shown in Figure 5, the relationship between velocity and money growth implied by the
endogenous segmentation model is very di®erent from that by the exogenous segmentation
model. Which model can match the data better?
Now, I use the cross-country data to examine the correlation between money growth rate
13Figure 6: Velocity and Money Growth (OECD 1970-95)
and velocity. Using the IFS data of 23 OECD countries in 1970-1995, Figure 6 plots the
(annual) income/consumption velocities of money measured in M1 and M2. The correlation
coe±cients between money growth rate and velocity are all signi¯cantly positive. Therefore,
the implications of the endogenous segmentation model is more consistent with the long run
relationship between money growth and the velocity of money exhibited by the cross-country
data.
5. Short Run Responses to Money Shocks
In this section, I report results on the dynamic responses to money supply shocks. In Section
5.1, I consider the exogenous segmentation model and derive the equilibrium e®ect of these
shocks. This model displays special features such as a linear in°ation response to shocks,
liquidity e®ects, and sluggish price adjustment. Then, in Section 5.2, I consider the endoge-
nous segmentation model, and use numerical examples to show that all these features are
not robust. In particular, monetary e®ects are non-linear with respect to the size of money
shocks.
145.1 Exogenous-Segmentation Model
This section studies the short run e®ects of money supply shocks in an exogenous segmenta-
tion model. Suppose an economy is initially in a symmetric stationary equilibrium with N
types and the money growth rate is ¹ss = 1. In period 1, there is a money growth shock ¢¹1
brought about by an open market operation. I ¯rst outline how to derive the transitional
path to simulate the e®ects of monetary shocks.
The transitional path can be solved by using the following steps11:
(1) By using the money market equilibrium condition and the ¯rst order conditions of
households, we can derive a set of equations expressing Pt in terms of Pt¡1;:::;Pt¡N+1. Given
the initial prices, the whole sequence of equilibrium commodity prices can then be solved
iteratively.
(2) The goods market equilibrium condition and the ¯rst order conditions of households
can be used to compute the sequence of equilibrium consumption of each type.








The price sequence can be substituted into these equations to yield the interest rates Rt
for t ¸ N in terms of R1;:::;RN¡1:
(4) Finally, by substituting the prices, interest rates and consumption derived above into
the life-time budget constraints of households, we can derive N ¡ 1 equations in N ¡ 1
unknowns R1;:::;RN¡1:
Following these steps, we can numerically derive the dynamic responses to a permanent
increase in the money growth rate12. I set a period as a quarter (¯ = 0:9873) and suppose
initially money grows at one percent per period (¹ss = 1:01). For simplicity and for easy com-
parison with Grossman and Weiss (1983) and Rotemberg (1984), I analyze as the benchmark
the exogenous segmentation model with N = 2. Suppose there is an unanticipated perma-
11Details are given in the Appendix.
12The e®ect of a temporary change in money growth is similar and is reported in the Appendix.
15nent money growth shock of size ¢¹1 = 0:25%. Figure 7 illustrates the dynamic responses
of price, velocity and interest rates to this money shock. The dynamic responses are derived
in the Appendix. Here, we summarize the general features of these dynamic responses 13.
(1) Sluggish price adjustment
The in°ation rate in period one is lower than the size of the shock. The reason is that the
new money received by households in the asset market is spent over the next two periods,
and thus price level goes up gradually.
(2) Linear in°ation response
In period one, the magnitude of price adjustment is proportional to the size of the money
shock in the sense that the current in°ation rate is a constant fraction of the money growth
rate.
(3) Convergence to steady state with dampened oscillations
The price level oscillates around and converges to the new steady state price level.
(4) Liquidity e®ect
In period one, because only a fraction of households are present in the asset market, the
interest rate has to drop to induce them to absorb all the money shock, leading to a liquidity
e®ect14.
(5) Interest Rate Cycle
The nominal interest rate (Rt = 1
qt) oscillates around
¹1
¯ with lower rates in odd periods and
higher rates in even periods, due to the persistent e®ect of wealth redistribution associated
with open market operation.
(6) Variability of velocity
As discussed in Section 4, the money injection redistributes money holdings among house-
holds, resulting in the °uctuation of velocity.
13Exogenous segmentation models discussed in Grossman and Weiss(1983) and Alvarez, Atkeson and Ed-
mond(2003) can generate similar implications.
14Note that there is real liquidity e®ect but not nominal liquidity e®ect in this case because the permanent
money shock leads to an in°ation expectation that drives up the nominal interest rate. There are nominal
liquidity e®ects for less permanent money shocks.

































Figure 7: Response to 1% Permanent Money Shock in Exogenous Segmentation Model (N =
2)
5.2 Endogenous-Segmentation Model
In this section, I consider the e®ects of di®erent monetary policies in an endogenous segmen-
tation model. Subsection A derives how policy e®ects of small money shocks depend on the
degree of asset market segmentation. Subsection B studies the e®ects of monetary shocks of
di®erent sizes by deriving the impact responses and transitional paths.
[A]. Policy E®ect and Degree of Asset Market Segmentation
In the exogenous segmentation model, the response to money shocks depends on the degree of
asset market segmentation when the shock hits the economy. In an endogenous segmentation
model, this initial degree of market segmentation is determined by such fundamentals as long-
run money growth rate and ¯xed cost. This section studies how the impact e®ects of small
money shocks depend on these fundamentals. I focus on small shocks such that agents are
not induced to adjust their transfer timing. A period is set as a quarter and pick ¯ = 0:9873.
In this experiment, the long-run money growth (¹ss) and ¯xed cost (´) pin down the steady
state degree of market segmentation. Suppose the economy is initially in steady state with
N types and is hit by a temporary injection of money. Figure 8 reports the degree of market
segmentation (N), the elasticities of in°ation, interest rate and velocity with respect to money
17shocks for di®erent combinations of ¹ss and ´. The elasticities are evaluated at the steady
state values.
Figure 8 shows that, for large ¹ss and small ´, there is no asset market segmentation
(N = 1). For example, look at the case when the money growth rate is 0:02 and the ¯xed
cost is 0:01. In this case, the elasticity of in°ation is one and the elasticities of interest and
velocity are zero: the price level is fully °exible and neither the interest rate nor the velocity
respond to the shock.
For small ¹ss and large ´, the asset market is segmented (N > 1). For example, look at
the case when the money growth rate is 0 and the ¯xed cost is 0:2. In this case, the elasticity
of in°ation is smaller than one and the elasticities of interest and velocity are negative: the
price adjustment is sluggish and the interest rate and the velocity drop in response to a
money injection.
In general, the elasticity of in°ation is increasing in ¹ss and decreasing in ´. In abso-
lute terms, the elasticities of interest and velocity are decreasing in ¹ss and increasing in
´. Therefore, an economy with lower long-run money growth and higher ¯xed cost should
have higher degree of asset market segmentation, and thus with bigger liquidity e®ect, price
sluggishness and reduction of velocity.15
[B]. Policy E®ect and Size of Money Shock
In the last section, I study the policy e®ect for small shocks in economies with di®erent initial
degree of market segmentation. In this section, I ¯x the initial degree of market segmentation
and study the e®ects of money shocks of di®erent sizes. It is straightforward to show the
following result (Proved in the Appendix.):
Proposition 3: In an endogenous segmentation model with N > 1, for a su±ciently
large money growth shock ¢¹1: (i) the equilibrium prices and allocation in an exogenous
segmentation model cannot be supported as an equilibrium, and (ii) there exists an equilibrium
with no liquidity e®ect and no sluggish price response.
15This is consistent with the ¯nding in the cross country study of liquidity e®ects by Lastrapes and
McMillin (2004). They ¯nd that the magnitude of the liquidity e®ect is decreasing in the degree of ¯nancial
development.


















































The idea is that for large ¢ ¹1, the current real money balance of households absent from
the asset market becomes so low that they are induced to pay the ¯xed cost and make money
transfers, thus disturbing the equilibrium allocation in an exogenous segmentation model.
Moreover, when all agents are induced to make money transfers, there is no asset market
segmentation, and thus liquidity e®ect and sluggish price response vanish. Several numerical
examples are provided below to highlight the non-linear response to money shocks of di®erent
sizes.
To illustrate the above idea, I consider a economy with ¯ = 0:9873, ¹ss = 1:01, ´ = 0:03
(in an endogenous segmentation model) and N = 2 (in an exogenous segmentation model).
Suppose the (gross) money growth rate is raised permanently from ¹ss to ¹ss+¢¹1 in period
1. To derive an equilibrium transitional path for each size of money shock ¢¹1, I repeat the
following steps:
(1) Conjecture households' timings of transfers.
(2) Aggregate household choices and compute the market clearing prices.
19(3) Given the prices, derive optimal choices of households.
Restart from (1) by updating the initial conjecture appropriately if needed.





































































































Figure 9: Response to Permanent Money Shocks in Period 1
Figure 9 plots the impact responses of interest rates, the in°ation rate and the degree of
market participation (the fraction of agents attending the asset market) to money shocks in
period one. Unlike in the exogenous segmentation model, the responses to money shocks in
an endogenous segmentation model can be non-linear and non-monotonic. For small shocks,
an exogenous segmentation model is a good approximation of the endogenous segmentation
model because the gain from adjusting transfer timings is small relative to the ¯xed cost. But
for large shocks, implications of the exogenous segmentation model are not robust. As the
money growth shock increases, more households choose to participate in the asset market in
period one. As a result, the real interest rate goes up and the magnitude of the liquidity e®ect
reduces. Moreover, since the money growth shock is permanent, households choose to increase
the frequency of asset market participation. With a higher speed of money circulation, the
in°ation rate goes up. The rise in in°ation expectation drives up the nominal interest rate.
Finally, for ¢¹1 > 1%, all households choose to attend the asset market every period. As a
result, there is no liquidity e®ect or sluggish price response.
Figure 10 shows the responses to money shocks in period 1 for di®erent sizes of the ¯xed
cost ´. As ´ reduces, households have higher incentive to pay the ¯xed cost and transfer





































































































Figure 10: Response to Permanent Money Shocks for Di®erent Fixed Costs in Period 1
money in the current period. As a result, for a given size of money shock, the interest rate,
the in°ation rate and the participation rate are (weakly) decreasing in ´. Thus, in response
to this type of shock, the implications of the exogenous segmentation model is less robust for
smaller ´.












Figure 11: Response to 1% Permanent Money Shocks
Figure 11 plots the dynamic responses of the real interest rate to a 1% money shock for
di®erent sizes of ¯xed cost. When the ¯xed cost is prohibitively high (as in the exogenous
segmentation model), we have liquidity e®ect and persistent oscillation. When ´ = 0:05,
the induced participation dampens the interest rate oscillation. Finally, when ´ = 0:01, all
21households are induced to participate every period, and thus the liquidity e®ect vanishes and
the real interest rate is constant over time.







































































































Figure 12: Response to Temporary Money Shocks in Period 1 ( ¹ss = 1:01, ¯ = 0:9873 and
´ = 0:025)
Now, we study the e®ect of a temporary money growth shock. In period one, the (gross)
money growth rate is raised temporarily from ¹ss to ¹1 = ¹ss + ¢¹1 and then it drops back
to ¹t = ¹ss for t ¸ 2. Figure 12 reports the impact responses in period one for ¹ss = 1:01,
¯ = 0:9873 and ´ = 0:025. For ¢¹1 > 3%, more households are induced to participate in
the asset market. As a result the nominal interest rate does not drop in response to further
money injection and thus the liquidity e®ect is smaller than in an exogenous segmentation
model. Since asset market participants tend to spend their money holdings slower than non-
participants, a rise in participation rate implies a slower money circulation. As a result, the
price response is even lower than in an exogenous segmentation model.
Again, the responses depends on the size of the shock. For a small shock (e.g. a one per
cent shock in Figure 13), the participation rate does not change on impact and the magnitude
of the liquidity e®ect is similar to that in an exogenous segmentation model. For a large shock
(e.g. a four per cent shock in Figure 14), the participation rate goes up on impact and the
liquidity e®ect is smaller than that in an exogenous segmentation model.
Figure 15 and Table 1 report the impact responses for both positive and negative (tem-









































































Figure 13: Response to 1% Temporary Money Shocks









































































Figure 14: Response to 4% Temporary Money Shocks
23Table 1: Response to temporary money shocks in period 1
¢¹1 %¢¼1 %¢R1 %¢r1 % ¢ Part.
-4% -264% 1.53% 3.44% 0%
-2% -139% 0.83% 1.79% 0%
-1% -71% 0.48% 0.93% 0%
0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
1% 75% -0.67% -1.05% 0%
2% 148% -1.35% -2.06% 0%
4% 290% -2.04% -3.62% 0.59%
porary) money shocks. In an endogenous segmentation model, the responses are asymmetric
to negative and positive shocks. It is in sharp contrast to an exogenous segmentation model
in which the responses are always symmetric. First, the participation rate responds more
to positive shocks than to negative shocks. To understand the intuition, we ¯rst note that
households with zero balance in their checking accounts must participate in the asset market
and thus the degree of market segmentation depends on whether the households with positive
balance choose to pay the ¯xed cost to participate. To see the reason for this asymmetry,
consider a stationary equilibrium in an exogenous segmentation model with N = 2 and focus
on the type of households who withdraws money only in even periods. In this stationary
equilibrium, the Euler equation will imply that their odd period consumption is always lower
than even period consumption because of discounting and (positive) in°ation. Now, suppose
in period one, these households are suddenly allowed to transfer money by paying a ¯xed
cost. If the ¯xed cost is zero, they should choose to withdraw a positive amount to smooth
the consumption pro¯le. If the ¯xed cost is big, they will choose to not to transfer. There-
fore, there is a tendency for them to withdraw a positive amount of money. Now, introducing
the unanticipated money injection in period one, a positive injection will reinforce the with-
drawal tendency and, if big enough, may outweigh the ¯xed cost. On the other hand, a
negative injection can induce the agent to deposit money only if it is big enough to cancel out
the combined e®ect of the ¯xed cost and that initial withdrawal tendency for consumption
smoothing.
Second, price is more °exible in response to positive shocks than to negative shocks.
Under a negative shock, the rise in nominal interest rate in period one induces (a fraction
of) households to economize on their money holding by attending the asset market in both
period one and two. This adjustment in transfer timing will speed up the money circulation
and dampens the drop in price level.





































































































Figure 15: Asymmetric Response to Temporary Money Shocks in Period 1





















Figure 16: Welfare and Temporary Money Shocks
Finally, Figure 16 reports the e®ects of temporary money shocks on the welfare of the
households. Denote the households with zero money holding at the beginning of period one
as type a (that is, Za
0 = 0) and denote the remaining households as type b (that is, Zb
0 > 0).
The life-time discounted utilities evaluated in period 1 of the two types of households are
plotted against the size of the money shock. A positive money shock redistribute wealth
from money rich type b households to money poor type a households. As a result, type
a's value is increasing in the size of the shock while type b's value is decreasing in it. The
graph suggests that, by not allowing households to choose the optimal transfer timing, an
exogenous segmentation model over-estimates the redistribution e®ect of a money shock.
6. Conclusion
I have developed a monetary model to endogenize agents' decision on money transfers between
the asset market and the goods market by introducing a ¯xed transaction cost. By modeling
the degree of market segmentation, this paper also endogenizes the magnitudes of liquidity
e®ects, price sluggishness and variability of velocity. I show that the implications of an
exogenous segmentation model are not robust in terms of the short run and long run e®ects
of monetary policy. I show that the endogenous segmentation model can generate the positive
26long run relationship between money growth and velocity in the data which the exogenous
segmentation model fails to capture. I also study the short run e®ects of unanticipated money
shocks. First, in an exogenous segmentation model, responses to money shocks are linear,
monotonic and symmetric. By contrast, in an endogenous segmentation model, responses
are non-linear, non-monotonic and asymmetric. Second, an exogenous segmentation model
is a good approximation of the endogenous segmentation model only for small money shocks.
For large money shocks, implications of the exogenous segmentation model are not robust.
In particular, for large persistent shocks, there is no liquidity e®ect and no sluggish price
response in an endogenous segmentation model.
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30APPENDIX
A. Derivation of Stationary Equilibrium in Exogenous Segmentation Models
Let °t(s) and ¸t(s) respectively denote the Lagrange multipliers for the constraints (3) and
(4) of a type s household. Let ±t(s) denote the multipliers on the non-negativity constraints
for Zt(s) of a type (s) household. The ¯rst order necessary conditions for the optimization
problem include
xt : °t(0) = ¸t(0)
ct(s) : °t(s) = ¯
t(Ptct(s))
¡1
Bt(s) : qt¸t(s) = ¸t+1(s + 1)
Zt(s) : ±t(s) + °t+1(s + 1) = °t(s)
I focus on equilibria in which two conditions are satis¯ed. The ¯rst condition is that the
nominal interest rate Rt ¡ 1 = 1
qt ¡ 1 is positive, implying no households will hold money in
the brokerage accounts. The second condition is that ct+1(0)Pt+1 > ¯ct(N ¡ 1)Pt for all t,
implying Zt(N ¡ 1) = 0 for all t. Under these assumptions, in a stationary equilibrium, the
¯rst order conditions and budget constraints imply (5) and (6). The goods market and the
money market equilibrium conditions imply (7) and (8).




j = n for j = 1;2;::: and for some
positive integer n.
Proof: For a given choice of d, the ¯rst order conditions with respect to fctg1
t=0 imply





ctj for j = 1;2;::: and k < tj+1 ¡ tj. Denoting the
initial wealth by w¡1 =
b¡1+p(1¡¿¹ss)=(1¡¯)
¹ss , we can solve for the optimal consumption in period
t associated with d as a fraction of the initial wealth: ct(d) = ft(d)w¡1: As a result, the payo®
associated with d is U(d) =
P1




t=0 ¯t [ln(ft(d)) ¡ J(d)´],
implying that the optimal choice of d is independent of the initial wealth. Therefore, if the
optimal date of the ¯rst transfer is t1, then the optimal date of the ith transfer is ti = i £ t1
for i = 1;2;:::
C. Derivation of G(n) and D(n)














s lnfs=(1 ¡ ¯
n) ¡ ´=(1 ¡ ¯
n) + ln(1 ¡ ¯















¡´(1 ¡ ¯)ln¯ ¡ ln(
¯
¹ss)f1 ¡ ¯n + nln¯g
i
Therefore, sign(V 0(n)) = sign(G(n) ¡ D(n)).
D. To prove: For each set of (´;¯;¹ss;¿), a SSE exists. Generically, this is the unique
SSE.
Proof: First, (C1) implies that the optimal choice of n is independent of initial bond
holding and price level, thus households' choices of n are independent. Given n¤, we can use
the formulae in section 3.1 to derive the symmetric stationary equilibrium. To see why the
equilibrium is generically unique, ¯rst note that there exists at most two equilibria which
happens when agents are indi®erent between n and n + 1, that is V (n + 1;´) = V (n;´). In
this case, we can raise the ¯xed cost to ´0 = ´ + " with " > 0. If " is su±ciently small, then
n¤ is still equal to n or n + 1. As a result, the unique optimal choice becomes n + 1 because
V (n + 1;´0) > V (n;´0).
















































ss if ¹ss 6= 1 (= ¹
N¡1
2
ss if ¹ss = 1)
F. Velocity is decreasing in N as ¯ ! 1























dN · 0 if
£
¹N
ss ¡ 1 ¡ N ln¹ss
¤
¸ 0. It can be shown that ¹N
ss ¡ 1 ¡ N ln¹ss > 0 for
¹ss 6= 1 and ¹N
ss ¡ 1 ¡ N ln¹ss = 0 for ¹ss = 1.
32G. Derivation of Transitional Path in an exogenous segmentation Model with
N types
For simplicity, here assumes zero money growth in the steady state and derives the e®ects
of a permanent increase in money stock. It is straightforward to extend to other cases. To
¯nd the transitional path, we make use of the following conditions:



















similar constraints apply to type 1;:::;N ¡ 1.












Mt(i) = Mt; all t
(3) Optimal Consumption:
Let Ái = ¯i¡1=
PN
j=1 ¯j¡1 and ©i =
PN
j=i Áj, for i = 1;:::;N, optimal choice of consump-




; for j = 0;:::;N ¡ 1
33similar conditions for type 1;:::;N ¡ 1.
(4) Equilibrium Price Sequence:
Money market clearing condition implies





























Pt = M1 ¡
N X
j=2
©jPt¡j+1;for t ¸ N












First, we can solve for the steady state:
(i) P = M=
PN
j=i ©j
(ii) M(0) = NP;M(j) = ©jM(0) for j = 1;:::;N ¡ 1
(iii) R = 1
¯
34(iv) cj = ÁjM(0)=P












for j = 1;:::;N ¡1:
To derive the transitional path, I ¯rst use (4) to compute the prices, then use (2) and
(3) to compute the consumption sequence. (1) can then imply the initial N ¡ 1 interest
rates (R1;:::;RN¡1). By equating the lifetime expenditure and wealth, one can get, for










where £ = (P0 + ¢M1) 1
1¡¯N + B0 ¡ B0(0)
Lastly, (5) can be used to derive the whole interest rate sequence.
H. Properties of dynamic response in exogenous segmentation model for N = 2
(i) Derivation of R1
First, the life-time expenditure of a type a is Expa
0 = P1ca
1 + 2(¢M1 + P0)=(1 ¡ ¯2). And








(1¡¯2)R1 . Solving for the R1 that equates
Expa
0 and W a










1+¯, we have P0¹ > P1 if ¯2 > 0.
(iii)
P1¡P0












= (¹ ¡ 1)
1+2¯
(1+¯)2
(iv) R1 < P2=(P1¯)
Real interest rate is smaller than ¯¡1 if
P1+¢M2
¢M1+¯P0 < P2=(P1¯). This is true because ¹(1 ¡
¯)(¹ ¡ 1) + ¯(¹P0 ¡ P1) > 0.
(v)Pt=Pt¡1 ! ¹






t¡1¡j [(1 ¡ Á)Mj+1 + ÁMj]
Therefore, ¹Pt¡1¡Pt = ¹(¡Á)t¡2P1¡(¡Á)t¡1P1¡(¡Á)t¡2 [(1 ¡ Á)M2 + ÁM1] ! 0 as Á < 1.
(vi) Interest rate Cycles











35As t ! 1, Reven > Rodd if (¹ ¡ 1)2(1 ¡ ¯2) + 2¯P0(¹ ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ¯) > 0.
I. Linear In°ation Response in Period 1 in a Exogenous segmentation Model
Proof: Consider an exogenous segmentation model with N types:































j=1 ¯j¡1(¹ ¡ 1)
Change in price is P1 ¡ P0 =
¹¡1 PN








j=1 ¯j¡1)2(¹ ¡ 1)
J. Dynamic responses to a temporary money growth shock in Exogenous seg-
mentation Model(N = 2)
Suppose initially there is no money growth (¹ss = 1) and ¯ = 0:96, The dynamic responses
to a temporary money growth shock ¢¹ = 0:1% is as follows:
K. Proof of proposition 3.
Proof: Start with the equilibrium prices and allocations in an exogenous segmentation
model equilibrium with N types. De¯ne the nominal wealth (excluding money holding) of a
type N ¡ 1 in period one as W0 and the nominal money holding as Z0. In this equilibrium,














for k = 0;1;2;::: and i = 0;:::;N ¡ 1
































Figure 1: Response to 0.1% Temporary Money Growth Shock in exogenous segmentation
Model (N = 2)
To disturb the above equilibrium, consider an alternative choice where type b transfers also

























for k = 0;1;2;::: and i = 0;:::;N ¡ 1
It can be shown that the gain from transferring in period one is V2(Z0;W0)¡V1(Z0;W0) =
log(Z0 + W0) ¡ ¢2 where ¢2 is a positive constant. The gain is positive for large ¹ because
W0 goes to in¯nity as ¹ increases.
(ii) To prove that it is optimal for a household with Z0(i) = 0 to transfer every period, we
need to show G(1) < D(1). This is true for large ¹. To prove that it is optimal for a household
with Z0(i) > 0 to transfer every period, I ¯rst de¯ne the real money balance in period one
as m = Z0(i)=P1 and the real wealth (excluding m) in period one as w = W0(i)=P1, where
W0(i) = P0 +
¯
1¡¯ + B0(i) ¡ B0 +
¹¡1
1¡¯. Also, by assuming a household will exhaust money
holding before any transfer, I de¯ne the value of making the ¯rst transfer in period T as
VT(m;w): It can be shown that V1(m;w) > VT(m;w) for all T > 1 if log[W0(i)+Z0(i)] > ¢3
(where ¢3 is a positive constant) which is true for large ¹. Finally, the condition for type b
to exhaust money holding before making transfer in period T is (1 ¡ ¯T¡1)w
¹T
¯2(T¡1) > Z0(i)
which is true for large ¹.
37